Wednesday, 28 September 2011

Swiss Franc (CHF) Devaluation – A Swiss perspective

On September 6th, 2011, the Swiss National Bank (SNB) shocked markets by announcing that the Swiss Franc was to be pegged to the Euro at an exchange rate of 1.20 (EUR/CHF). This was a move announced in the, “strongest language from a central bank in the modern era”. To further highlight the severity of what this meant, the Swiss Franc dove 9.32 percent to 1.212 francs per Euro just after the announcement in what Chief Economist at World First (a foreign exchange broker) Jeremy Cook called, “the single largest foreign exchange move I have ever seen (…) This dwarfs moves seen post Lehman Brothers, 7/7, and other major geopolitical events in the past decade".
                                                                                                    Source: Financial Times

Critics were quick to point out that this would have repercussions in the form of intensified currency wars, with the Japanese for example likely to implement similar measures to slow the Yen’s appreciation in future. The Swiss Franc’s image as a safe haven currency immediately took a hit. With the world’s other major currencies all in trouble (especially USD and EUR), gold, already overvalued, appeared as one of very few alternatives left for market participants seeking safety (it reached an all-time high on the day of the SNB announcement of over $1920). The SNB decision was flagged as an uncooperative and drastic move, only further destabilizing the developed world in uncertain times.

However, people analyzing this from a global macro perspective are quick to overlook what a dramatic impact the currency appreciation was having on Switzerland. It was regarded as an, 'acute' threat to the economy and labour market. It was estimated to be a risk factor that could lead to recession and deflation. To display the extent this affected the economy, consider food maker Nestle whose first-half sales in 2011 were down 13%, although they rose 7.5% on an absolute, currency adjusted basis. Credit Suisse announced losses of even greater magnitude where revenues would have been 37.7% higher without Franc appreciation. Efficient companies performing well are suffering. All sectors are affected, hotels expecting 3 to 5% less guests, workers are having to accept increased working hours to make up for lost competitiveness and major retailers are taking dozens of products off shelves after failed price cut negotiations with manufacturers. Ironically, the entire economy, which fundamentally is doing very well and is stable, is under immense pressure because of this reason (such strength being the cause for many investors to invest in the Franc).

Additionally, two factors worsened fears. Firstly, any previous attempts by the SNB to intervene and cool the franc had failed, prominently displayed in the loss of SFr14.3 billion ($14.8billion) generated by the SNB after massive Euro purchases between March 2009 and June 2011 which did close to nothing to stop the currency’s rise. Secondly, the breakneck speed of appreciation was something that had an effect as companies were not having time to react or implement safety measures before it was too late.  

                                                                                                              Source: Financial Times

This reveals how, from a Swiss person’s perspective, the currency intervention was an impressive and successful development. It reminds many of the move taken in a similar environment in the 70s when Switzerland implemented negative real interest rates to prevent excess capital flows due to similar reasons people are seeking out the Franc today, an unheard of move at the time. As a whole, the Swiss feel delight and are comforted by the fact that their central bank, as well as politicians, are able to act quickly when they need to in the interest of their people, even if this means internationally unpopular and/or dramatic unprecedented moves such as this one. This is comforting especially in light of the relatively slow political progress of many other countries in the western world in 2011.




http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424053111904006104576499430671400702.html



Wednesday, 21 September 2011

Dangerous Letters Game

1-3 letters is all it takes to rate a country, a company and/or its financial securities. To indicate, for better or worse, the health of the entity as it stands now and is likely to in the foreseeable future. The ratings are said to affect borrowing costs, the capital flows in an out of the country or firm, asset pricing, forecasts and opinions. Investment grade ratings range from (for S&P) AAA (no risk of default) to BBB after which a security is classified as 'high yield' or 'junk' down to C (highest risk of default). They are significant and are monitored closely by analysts across the globe. Hence in essence, a rating identifies the risk associated with investing into the entity in question. Or does it?
The USA downgrade from AAA rating to AA+ on the 5th of August 2011 was predicted by many to cause calamity in the markets. Leading editors of the world’s prominent financial publications voiced their concerns on the impact the downgrade could have once markets would open the following Monday, August 8th. However, widespread panic never occurred and the most important indicators reveal what little real impact the downgrade has had. American Treasury yields, which many experts were certain would increase to compensate for the higher risk, remain at near 2%, even falling to 1.875% on September 21st, the lowest point since figures dating back to 1953. US debt is still regarded as the safest in the world by the markets, with or without AAA.






Mortgage Backed Securities (MBS) leading up to the financial crisis were complex constructs of mortgages that when packaged by financial engineers at the most prominent of investment banks often received high (investment grade) ratings by leading agencies. However, apart from the handful of people that designed them, nobody knew how they were constructed and what constituted an MBS (often loans from overexposed borrowers with little chance of paying back when house prices stopped rising). Least of all the rating agencies that rated these securities as safe and upon whose judgement of A or AA vast fortunes were invested up until 2008. The subprime mortgage crisis eventually took its toll, wiping out Billions of Dollars that may never have gone lost had the rating agencies been able to calculate the true risk they labelled as safe. This is another case in which ratings turned out to be near meaningless.

Example of the construct of a MBS, little understood by ratings agencies
                                                                                                                                            Source: Wikipedia

Additionally to not always having an impact, the process of rating a country or firm may be risky in itself. The highly publicized downgrading of the USA by S&P could have easily led to a downgrade war amongst rating agencies (S&P, Moody’s, Fitch) as these private companies vie for attention and may not have wanted to feel ‘left behind’ in any bold moves that give their competitors an advantage. Thankfully, a downgrade war with real impact and amplification of market fears has not taken hold.  Similarly, there is an incentive problem as rating agencies are paid to rate the securities of firms by the very firms that issue them. If you are given money to rate someone’s merchandise you do not want to tell them it is highly dangerous as this will prompt them to go to your competitor that may be less harsh, leaving you empty handed.

Ratings agencies should be nationalised. This would mitigate the possibility of downgrade wars and incentive issues, both aspects coming naturally in privatised, open-market competitive moves that can serve a firm well but are in this context out of place. A rating needs to reflect risk as it most accurately can be, not as it most favourably can be to serve the interests of the rating agency.  
Make no mistake, ratings do remain important, especially to value for example countries investors have little knowledge about (frontier economies come to mind such as Colombia which is investment grade rated which will likely be important to it and help it gain FDI). However, ratings are not the end-all “stamp of approval” to determine the standing of the rated entity.  Investment professionals and the media need to regard ratings as nothing more than a support to an argument, not as the source of an argument.

Comments?

Further Reading:

http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2011-04-13/moody-s-s-p-caved-to-mortgage-pressure-by-goldman-ubs-levin-report-says.html
http://news.yahoo.com/geithner-u-treasuries-still-safe-downgrade-225436759.html